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ABSTRACT

Cluster computing has been attracting more and more attention from both the
industrial and the academic world for its enormous computing power, cost effective, and
scalability. Beowulf type cluster, for example, is a typical High Performance Computing
(HPC) cluster system. Availability, as a key attribute of the system, needs to be
considered at the system design stage and monitored at mission time. Moreover, system
monitoring is a must to help identify the defects and ensure the system's availability
requirement.
In this study, novel solutions which provide availability modeling, model
evaluation, and data analysis as a single framework have been investigated. Three key
components in the investigation are availability modeling, model evaluation, and data
analysis. The general availability concepts and modeling techniques are briefly reviewed.
The system's availability model is divided into submodels based upon their
functionalities. Furthermore, an object oriented Markov model specification to facilitate
availability modeling and runtime configuration has been developed. Numerical solutions
for Markov models are examined, especially on the uniformization method. Alternative
implementations o f the method are discussed; particularly on analyzing the cost o f an
alternative solution for small state space model, and different ways for solving large
sparse Markov models. The dissertation also presents a monitoring and data analysis
framework, which is responsible for failure analysis and availability reconfiguration. In
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addition, the event logs provided from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have
been studied and applied to validate the proposed techniques.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Cluster computing has become a cost effective and popular High Performance
Computing (HPC) solution for its enormous computational power. High availability
features have been increasingly vital to ensure that cluster computing environments can
provide continuous services. It is imperative to know the dependability parameters during
the conceptual design stages, since these parameters help in facilitating design trade-off
and refinement (system cost vs. system reliability). The early evaluation o f system
characteristics, such as dependability [1], timeliness, and correctness, is necessary to
assess whether the system being developed satisfies its goals and requirements. A typical
availability modeling method is based on analytical formalisms such as fault tree
[29][31], Markov chains [32][33][34], Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) [38][39], etc. This skill
set requirement inevitably creates an issue for software designers, architects, and people
in management who may be unfamiliar with these theoretical methodologies.
Consequently, reliability engineers may be required to participate in the design and
evaluation phases which lead to a two-step approach: system design and availability
modeling. This situation clearly increases the complexity in team communication and,
therefore, in product development. Moreover, the analytical models are still primitive; for
example, a Markov chain consists o f only state space and transitions, while SPN has

1
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places and transitions. As a consequence, Markov chain and Petri Net models are often
complex when the systems are non-trivial. These large models may be beyond the
intuition o f modelers, may lose the logic view of the system, and may become error
prone.
The need for early evaluation demands standardized and well-defined design
methods and languages. A variety o f software packages exist to facilitate availability
modeling and specify the models in compact forms [11][12][34][36][43]. The Unified
Modeling Language (UML) is a widely-adopted standard modeling language used to
visualize, specify, construct, and document the artifacts o f a software system [2]. Using
UML for availability modeling will reduce the gap between the system architects and
software developers who are keen on using UML, but are unfamiliar with dependability
modeling formalisms.
Once the cluster system is in operational stage, monitoring system’s health is a
must. This is to ensure that the system’s runtime availability meeting its design goal, and
helping to identify the trouble cause. Moreover, updating the system’s availability
information dynamically can provide most recent status o f the system; which in turn
enables the system’s scheduler to make a better decision, thus improve the throughput o f
the cluster system.
The objective o f this research is to investigate a novel technique that will facilitate
the availability modeling, monitoring and evaluation on HPC cluster systems. Our
approach is to create an availability model which is generic enough to simply the users’
effort, eliminate the need for manual remodeling, and can be customized dynamically.
Then, we exploit a systematic way towards generation and solution o f the model.
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Furthermore, the monitoring process should be able to dynamically update the
availability information to reflect the most recent failure and repair events.
The outcome o f this study will provide an effective solution for HPC cluster
systems’ availability modeling and evaluation. The research result will reduce the effort
of availability modeling, provide most recent availability information, ensure the
availability requirement, enable the scheduler to make a better decision, and finally will
improve the overall system performance.

1.1 HPC Cluster System Architecture
Cluster computing technique involves clustering multiple commercial-of-the-shelf
(COTS) computing nodes to accomplish performance and availability, which deals with
perceptive and actual outages. With both hardware and software infrastructure
components, clusters are aimed to achieve application workload sharing and fail-over
capabilities. Among these, the Beowulf type cluster systems [44] have become popular
for its price/performance, flexibility o f configuration and update, and scalability.
A HPC cluster system consists o f multiple computers communicated via network
connections. The main HPC objective is normally targeted to achieve the best possible
completion time and performance while executing a parallel application on as many
possible nodes within the system. There are two types o f nodes: head nodes (servers) and
computing nodes (clients). Servers are taking requests and dispatch the tasks to the
computing nodes, where the actual work processed. The systems are equipped with
software packages to facilitate massive parallel computing; the MPI (message passing
interface), for example, is a common programming paradigm. A parallel application runs
simultaneously on a portion or all o f the computers in the system. Unfortunately, if one
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computer which the application is running on fails, the application hangs. This issue is
currently a major drawback o f MPI applications on the HPC cluster system.
Cluster systems can be configured based on the need [87][88][90]. For example,
the servers can be classified as active-cold standby, active-warm standby, and activeactive servers. Figure 1.1 illustrates an example of an HPC cluster system with two
servers and multiple computing nodes. The active-active cluster means there are two (or
more) servers are taking requests from the outside, mastering the cluster system. The
active-warm standby type o f cluster consists o f a primary server, which is currently
handling outside request, and the warm standby server is waiting to take over the control
once the primary server has failed. The active-cold standby scheme is similar to the
active-warm standby scheme; they differ in that once the primary fails, the cold standby
server will be booted and take over the control.

Admir

Figure 1.1 An HPC Cluster system with two servers
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1.2 Overview of the Framework
This dissertation includes three major aspects, namely (1) the modeling, (2) model
evaluation, and (3) monitoring and analysis. Figure 1.2 shows the overview o f the
framework included in this dissertation.

Model Evaluation

Monitoring and
A nalysis

Figure 1.2 Overview o f the framework
The modeling part investigates the possibility o f using an alternative specification
of the system availability model, including model decomposition. In this way, the
availability model is more intuitive to the modeler, and is able to be updated during the
runtime that facilitates the dynamic monitoring and analysis. An object-oriented
modeling scheme [81][82][83] is studied for complex component interactions, and k-outof-n structure is employed for independent identical components (i.i.d.) availability
evaluation.
The modeling evaluation part is dealing with the solution o f the availability
models. Some models, such as the k-out-of-n structure, is given by formulas, while the
others such as Markov model need numerical solutions. In this dissertation, the general
methods o f numerical solutions on Markov model are illustrated. This dissertation
presents the uniformization method in detail for readers without much mathematical
background, analyzes the possible alternative implementations and the cost o f the small
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state space implementation, and finally proposes a light weight solution on large sparse
Markov models [84],
The monitoring and analysis is responsible for ensuring the system’s health,
performing data analysis, and updating the availability during the runtime. Currently,
each computer in the system is assumed to be a single instance, and the failure and repair
events are stored in the system’s log file. The monitoring facility is responsible to extract
these events o f interest from the log file and write them into a maintained configuration
file. Whenever there is a failure or a repair event happens, the monitoring facility will
update the configuration file and the system’s availability model [79]. Then it passes this
information to the evaluation facility to reevaluate the system’s availability. This
framework can certainly be extended to monitoring applications o f interest and record
more detailed cause o f the events. The latter needs to classify failures into more detailed
events, group them into different categories in a tree like structure. This can also help to
identify the root cause o f the failure.

1.3 Components of the Framework
Each of the three major facilities in the framework includes several components.
Figure 1.3 shows the components inside the framework in a tree like structure.
As stated earlier, the framework has three major facilities: the analytical
modeling, the model evaluation, and monitoring and analysis. The modeling facility
includes the modeling specification, in which the k-out-of-n structure and the objectoriented Markov model specification is adopted and developed. The UML modeling is
given as an example and needs to be addressed in the future work.
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The model evaluation facility includes the k-out-of-n structure and Markov model
solutions. The formula for each component’s availability is also given as the fundamental
aspect in the k-out-of-n structure. The Markov model solution deals with the numerical
solutions of Markov models. Different solution techniques are illustrated in the
framework. The uniformization method is the major choice for solving Markov models.
Alternative implementations o f the method are discussed, particularly on the small state
space and the way o f solving large sparse Markov models. Runge-Kutta method is the
second choice that can be used for the comparison purpose.

Framework

Evaluation

Analytical Modal

Modal
Specification

Analysis

Markov Model

OOMS

RungeK uua

Mean time
estimate

Figure 1.3 Components in the framework
The monitoring and analysis facility has two major functionalities, the monitoring
and update daemon, and the data analysis feature. The first is used to monitor the
system’s health and update the system’s availability configuration. The second is
responsible for data analysis whenever there are failure and repair events. The data
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analysis includes a mean time estimation and data fitting test. Currently, we propose
using the goodness-of-fit technique to validate whether the events are fitted into
exponential distribution. Other distribution such as Weibull distribution and alternative
testing techniques such as Chapman-Smimov test [71] may be included in the future.

1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter Two, we introduce the
background and general concepts o f the reliability and availability modeling. In Chapter
Three, we present the model decomposition and a variety o f availability models. The
object-oriented Markov model specification is illustrated in Chapter Four. Chapter Five
depicts the numerical solution o f Markov models. The monitoring and analysis facility is
discussed in Chapter Six. The conclusion and future work is presented in Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND GENERAL CONCEPTS

In this chapter, we introduce some background information concerning the
evaluation o f vulnerability to fault tolerance systems. We begin by introducing some
definitions o f terminologies related to the measure o f system vulnerability. Then we
illustrate the three alternative measuring techniques, namely lifetesting, simulation, and
analytical models. Since varieties o f analytical models have been introduced in the past
decades, a brief overview o f the analytical models is depicted and categorized into
combinatorial model, Markov models, and other models deviated from Markov models.
We then explore the existing software packages for model generation and solutions.
Finally, since the steady-state availability o f a two-state Markov model is used through
many parts o f this dissertation, a closed form solution is given at the end o f this chapter
for reference.

2.1 Definition of Terminologies
Definition 2.1 Reliability
The reliability /?(t)of a system is the probability that the system survives until
time t [31]. From a mathematical point o f view, the reliability /?(t) o f a system S can be
expressed as:
R(t) = Pr(S is fully functioning in [0, /])

9
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Let X be the random variable representing the lifetime o f a system, and let / be
the probability density function (p.d.f.) and F be the cumulative density function (c.d.f.)
of the variable X . Then the system reliability at time t can be depicted as

Rif) = P r(T

>r) = l - JF(f) = l - J o

f{x)dx

(2.1)

Because
J"

f(x)tbc =l

Hence, the reliability o f a system can be expressed in

r({)=I: / w* - Jof(x)dx=jr

(2-2)

Normally, it is assumed that the system isworking properly at the instant t = 0.
Yet, it is possible to allow that the system is defective to begin with a probability p , i.e.,
F(o) = p . For such a case, the reliability o f the system is

R(t)=\-p-\'0f(x)dx

(2.3)

Definition 2.2 Availability
The instantaneous availability A(t) o f a system is the probability that the system
is operating correctly at time t , regardless o f the number o f times it may have failed and
been repaired in the interval (0, t) [31].
The steady-state availability Ass is a measure o f the expected fraction time that
the system is available for useful computation, and is obtained by taking the limit o f A(t)
as t -» oo, given that the limit exists. Thus,
Ass =\im A(t)
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Definition 2.3 MTTF
The mean time to failure (MTTF) o f a system is the expected time until the
occurrence o f the system failure.
MTTF = £ R(t)dt

(2.5)

Definition 2.4 MTTR
The mean time to repair (MTTR) is a measure o f expected time for repair o f a
failed system.
Definition 2.5 MTBF
The mean time between failure (MTBF) is a measure o f expected mean time
between failures in a system with repair, and it depends on both failure and repair
processes, and
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR

(2.6)

If both the MTTF and MTTR are available, then the steady-state availability o f
the system may be calculated as:
MTTF
MTTF
Ass = -------------------- = ---------“ MTTF + MTTR MTBF

,
(2.7)
v

From the definitions o f reliability and availability given above, the difference
between reliability and availability is that reliability requires that at no time within the
interval [0, t] may the system fail, whereas availability permits the possibility that the
system may have failed and subsequently been repaired one or more times before time t.
In general, the type o f system will determine whether reliability or availability is
the preferred measure for a particular system. Reliability is required for non-repairable
systems. Examples o f such systems are flight control systems, safety control systems o f
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nuclear plants, and robots sent to Mars, for which repairs during the mission are
impossible, or failures are disaster events. On the other hand, availability is usually
preferred for repairable systems although reliability may also be a useful measure of
interest. Examples o f such systems are telecommunication switching systems and
business transaction systems. In systems like these, operation often continues in a
degraded state for a period o f time following component failures. Laprie conceptualized
dependability as a generic concept which covers a range o f concepts including reliability,
availability, safety, etc. [1], As stated by Laprie, dependability is defined as the ability o f
the system to perform the task that is assigned to it or, more quantitatively, the
probability that the system fulfills its tasks.
This dissertation considers the cluster computing systems which are repairable
systems; therefore, availability is the primary measures o f interest to us.

2.2 System Evaluation Techniques
When we are trying to evaluate the dependability o f any systems, it is an attempt
to predict the future safety behavior o f the system based on historical information that is
available about the system. The system vulnerability to failure evaluation techniques can
be classified into three categories: lifetesting, simulation, and analytical models. This
section briefly introduces the basic concepts on the three techniques.
2.2.1 Lifetesting
Lifetesting is to predict the system’s behavior based on the existing technology,
past experiences and observations. If the historical information o f an existing
component/system is available about its past performance and failure behavior, one may
assume that it might continue to behave in the future as it has in the past. For example, if
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a CPU chip is known for its failure rate, then we can assume that other chips
manufactured with the same technology and under the same condition will exhibit the
same failure rate. Therefore, lifetesting is the use o f historical information to provide an
estimate o f future vulnerability to failure.
The usefulness o f lifetesting is limited to systems that are constructed using well
established technology, and it is not generally suitable for evaluating new systems
constructed under the state o f art technologies.
For highly reliable systems, failures o f units in use are rare events. Hence, it
might take years to get sufficient data to perform useful evaluations for such systems.
Therefore, other methods must be considered to perform system evaluations, or for the
purpose o f aiding design decisions for systems that have not yet been built.
2.2.2 Simulation
Simulation is another technique to evaluate measures such as reliability,
availability, and performance. The simulation process consists o f three parts: (1) a
computer representation o f the relevant parts o f the real world system is constructed first,
(2) a series o f random events to which the system must respond is generated to simulate
the environment in which the system under test is embedded, and (3) observations are
made o f the system reaction to the events. This process is repeated numerous times in
order to get statistically a number o f trials at which the behavior o f the model should
closely resemble the behavior o f the real system. Examples of simulation techniques can
be found in studying the effect o f a new generation bomb by simulating different
surrounding environments.
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Simulation is a useful modeling technique for evaluating measures because the
computer representation can model the system to virtually any level o f detail desired by
the user. Furthermore, it is a versatile modeling technique, for it can be used to evaluate
any measure for the system. The drawback is that the number o f trials required may be
large; therefore, the total computational effort required may be expensive.
2.2.3 Analytical Modeling
Analytical models are mathematical models which express particular aspects o f
system behavior that are of interest. A mathematical model is an abstraction from the real
world system o f aspects that relate only to the behavior and characteristics o f the system
that are o f interest. All remaining details about the system are not considered, for the
reason that managing the complexity o f representing the system’s behavior exactly in
every detail is generally intractable. Furthermore, most details o f the system’s
characteristics and behavior are not relevant to capturing the specific behavior o f interest,
so there seems little point to include them in the representation under evaluation.
Analytical models can sometimes give closed form results, but often they need to
be solved using numerical techniques. Model size depends on both the number of
components and the detail o f modeled behaviors. The more components present within
the system and the more detailed the system behavior, the larger the model size. When
the model size becomes too large for the calculation of an exact result, suitable
approximation techniques must be applied to the model to obtain acceptable result.
Approximation techniques trade solution accuracy for model complexity, allowing the
modeler to obtain a result within some range o f values for a model which would
otherwise be too large to be solved for any result at all.
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Examples o f analytical models are combinatorial models, Markov models, Petri
Nets, and hierarchical models. Each type o f these models requires different solution
techniques and differs in the range o f system behavior that they can model.

2.3 Analytical Models
Analytical models are mathematical models which are abstractions from the real
world problems that relate only to the behavior and characteristics o f the system that are
of interest. Analytical models include reliability block diagram (RBD), fault tree (FT),
reliability graph, Markov model, semi-Markov model, Petri Net, hybrid model, etc. [31].
In general, these models can be classified into two categories, namely the combinatorial
models and Markov models. Reliability block diagram (RBD), fault tree (FT), and
reliability graph are in the category o f combinatorial models; the rest o f the models
mentioned above are in the Markov models category. The combinatorial models are also
referred to as the non-state space models, and the Markov models are referred to as the
state space models.
2.3.1 Combinatorial Models
Combinatorial models were the earliest type o f analytical model in general use for
system dependability analysis. Combinatorial models apply well to systems in which
system failure behavior can be characterized by simple combinations o f component
failure. In general, combinatorial models capture the static behavior o f the system. The
solutions o f these types are simply series-parallel reliability computations. Reliability
block diagram (RBD), fault tree (FT), and reliability graph are in this category. They are
similar in the way that they capture conditions that make a system fail in terms o f
structural relationships between the system components. In other words, they are visual
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representations o f so-called network reliability models. A fault tree without repeated
components is equivalent to a reliability diagram, and both of them are a subset o f the
reliability graph, which is in turn a subset o f the fault tree with repeated components.
The solution involves (1) a set o f minimal paths (minpath) is generated, (2) all the
paths are pair wise disjoint, and (3) apply the series-parallel formula. Algorithms for
generating disjoint minpath are discussed in [15]-[ 19]. The major difference o f these
algorithms is that o f using single variable inversion versus multiple variables inversion.
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)
A reliability block diagram represents the logical structure o f a system in regards
to how the components’ reliability affects the overall system reliability. Components are
combined into blocks in series, in parallel or in k-out-of-n configurations. A series
structure imposed on a set o f components means that for the whole subsystem to work,
every component has to be functioning. On the other hand, a parallel structure means that
the whole subsystem can function if any one o f the components is working. A k-out-of-n
structure means that the whole subsystem can function if k or more o f the components is
working.
Figure 2.1 shows an example o f a HPC cluster system with two servers and n
computing nodes. The requirement to keep the system working is that at least one server
and the computing nodes need to be functioning. Typically, in HPC environments,
computing nodes model follow a series structure. On the other hand, the server model
follows a parallel structure. The block diagram shows that the two servers are in parallel,
and the n computing nodes in series.
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server
node

node

server

Figure 2.1 A RBD example
The distribution function for the failure time o f a subsystem with n components is
given by [29] [31]:

for a parallel structure
for a series structure

(2 .8)

Where Ft(t) is the probability for component i to fail at time t .
Fault Tree
Fault tree is a non-state space reliability modeling technique. A fault tree model
represents all the sequences o f individual component failures that cause the system to
stop functioning in a tree like structure. The starting point is the root o f the tree, which is
the undesirable event o f the system. A fault tree is a pictorial representation o f the
combination o f events that can cause the occurrence o f an undesired event. All o f the
events are combined by means o f logic gates. Each gate has inputs and outputs. The input
is either an event or the output o f another gate. The output of an AND gate is a logic 1 if
and only if all o f its inputs are logic 1. On the other hand, the output o f an OR gate is a
logic 1 if and only if one or more o f its input are at logic 1. Figure 2.2 shows the fault tree
model o f the two servers and n nodes cluster computing system as an illustrating
example.
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1
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Figure 2.2 A Fault tree example
The failure distribution F(t) for the failure time o f a subsystem is computed as:

AND gate
O R gate

(2.9)

i=i
Where F, (t) is the probability for component i to fail at time
The k-out-of-n structure
A k-out-of-n structure can be in two different forms, k-out-of-n “good”, and kout-of-n “fail”. A k-out-of-n “good” structure means that the whole subsystem can
function if k or more o f the components is working. On the other hand, a k-out-of-n “fail”
structure means that the whole subsystem fails if k or more o f the components has failed.
The backbone o f the k-out-of-n structure is in a form o f binomial trials. Thus, the failure
distribution F (t) for the failure time o f a subsystem for a k-out-of-n “fail” structure is

(2 . 10)

The distribution function for a k-out-of-n “good” structure can be acquired in the
same way. Note that, Equation 2.10 is applied to a k-out-of-n “fail” structure with n
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identical components. If the structure constitutes non-identical components, the
corresponding equation is complicated. Varieties o f algorithms [13][14] exist to make the
calculations faster on this behave, and they are out o f the scope o f this dissertation.
Reliability Graphs
A reliability graph is another representation o f combinatorial models. It consists
o f a set o f nodes and edges. The graph contains a source node and a destination node, and
the edges are assigned with failure probability or failure rates. A system represented by a
reliability graph fails when there is no path from the source node to the destination node.
The reliability or unreliability o f the graph is solved by (1) generating the set o f minpath
or mincut [15]-[20], (2) making all the path or cut pair wise disjoint, and (3) summing up
the probability o f all the minpath or mincut.
Availability Modeling Using Combinatorial Models
Combinatorial models cannot capture the repair event. For this reason, they are
generally used for reliability measures. However, with certain modifications, and assume
each components are stochastic independent, combinatorial models can be applied to
system availability measures.
For a repairable component with failure rate X and repair rate pi , its
instantaneous availability A(t) is

4 0 = —

7
pi + TX + ~px^+L X

e ~(M+*)'

(2 .H )

and its instantaneous unavailability U(t) is
£/(<)= 1-/<(/) = - A pi + X

(2.12)
pi + X

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

The proof is given at the end o f this chapter, via a two state Markov model.
Together with the equations shown above, the combinatorial model can be applied to
availability modeling, under the assumption that the components are stochastic
independent.
2.3.2 Markov Models
Dependability models often need to capture the sequence o f component failures
when modeling fault tolerant systems. Combinatorial models have difficulty in capturing
this type of system behavior because o f their combinatorial characteristics. To address
this type of system behavior, Markov models have been popular techniques applied to a
variety o f fields. A Markov process, which is a special case o f stochastic processes whose
dynamic behavior is such that, the probability distributions for its future development
depend only on the present state and not how the process arrived in that state. From the
view o f a system model, a Markov process represents the system as a finite group o f
states in which the system can exist, and a set o f transitions that moves the systems
between states over time. The following gives the general concepts.
Definition Stochastic Process
A stochastic process is a family o f random variables

t e T}, defined on a

given probability space, indexed by the parameter t, where t varies over an index set T.
Definition Markov Process
A stochastic process {x(t)| t e T } is called a Markov process if for any
t0 < tx < ---< tn < t , the conditional distribution o f X (t)

for given values o f

X ( t0), X ( tx), ■••X {tn) depends only on X ( tn), that is
p \ x { t ) < x I X ( t , ) = x „ * (< _ ,) = X,-,, ■- , X ( t , ) = *„ ] = p[x{f) < x I X ( t , ) = x , ]
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A Markov process is called a Markov chain if the state space is discrete. If the
parameter time space T o f a Markov chain is discrete, then it is a discrete time Markov
chain (DTMC). If the parameter space T is continuous, it is a continuous time Markov
chain (CTMC), otherwise. In general, a Markov process is referred to as a continuous
time Markov chain. If the transition rates are constant, the Markov chain is said to be
homogeneous. This implies that the time spent waiting in any state is exponentially
distributed. On the other hand, if the rates o f transitions are functions o f time instead of
constants, the Markov chain is said to be non-homogeneous. If the distributions o f the
holding time o f any states are general distributions other than exponential distribution,
the Markov model is said to be a semi-Markov model.
Classification o f States
o

The state j is said to be reachable from state i if the probability p y > 0.

o

Transient state: A state is said to be transient if and only if there is a positive
probability that the process will not return to this state,

o

Recurrent state: A state is said to be recurrent if and only if, starting from a state,
the process eventually returns to the state with probability one.

o

Periodic and aperiodic state: A recurrent state is periodic with period d if
Py

(0 =0 except t = d, 2d, •••. A state that is not periodic is an aperiodic state.

o

Absorbing state: A state i is said to be an absorbing state if and only if p H = 1

o

Ergodic state: An aperiodic recurrent state with a finite mean recurrent time is
called ergodic.
The majority Markov models o f repairable computing systems are ergodic. In this

dissertation, only homogenous ergodic CTMC is o f interest.
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Continuous Time Markov Chain [50]
Let E be a countable set o f state space, and let { x ( t ) \ t >0} stochastic process
t e R + and x ( t ) e E . {*(01* >0} is called a continuous time Markov chain if
V

/, ,z2, •••,/* e E , V t,s e R +, and V s ,,s 2,- ■■,sk e R + with s, < s for all I e [l,A:],
p[2f(t + 5) = 7 | ^ ) = /,x (5 1) = i1,- - - , x ( 5 j = / j = jp [x (t +5) = y | x ( 5 ) = /]

(2-14)

whenever both sides are well defined. It is called homogeneous if Equation 2.14 is
independent o f s.
Chapman-Kolmogorov Equation
Let P be the probability transition matrix o f a CTMC, and P =

where

i, j e E and py(t)= P[ x(t + s) = j \ X( s) = /]. The Chapman-Kolmogorov Equation can
be described as
P(t + s) = P(t)p(s)

(2.15)

with the properties o f P(o) = I and P{t)e = e , where / isthe identify matrix and e is a
vector with all elements are Is.
Chapman-Kolmogorov forward differential equation
The infinitesimal generator matrix Q is defined as

e=limM ^ L
[

At

(2, 6)

4

J

and the Chapman-Kolmogorov forward differential equation is defined as

-
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Let 7r(o) and n(t) be the initial probability vector and the probability vector o f
the CTMC at time t , respectively (7r(/) = /r(o).P(f)), then Equation 2.15 can be expressed
as
(2.i8)
A stationary distribution o f continuous time Markov chain is any probability vector n on
the state space E such that V t e R*
n{t)Q = 0

(2.19)

ne = 1

(2.20)

and

where e is a vector with all elements are 1s, i.e., e = {l, 1,■••, l}.
2.3.3 The Other Markov Models
This section briefly introduces some models deviated from the Markov models,
include Markov reward model, Petri Nets, and Hybrid models. Because o f the fact that
they are built on top o f the Markov model, therefore, it is reasonable to place them into
the Markov models category.
Markov reward model [35] is a Markov model with the reward assigned to each
states and transitions, and each submodel is linked by mathematical expressions.
Petri Nets [40] consists o f places and transitions, and it is more recent than other
models. A number o f tokens exist in the net and migrate from place to place according to
the rules upon which each transition becomes enabled. Stochastic Petri Nets permit the
transitions to require a delay period that has a specified distribution before the transition
becomes enabled. Petri nets can model system behaviors such as event conflicts,
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concurrency, sequencing, forking, joining, and synchronization. Petri net models may be
evaluated either by simulation or by reduction to a Markov model. There are several
kinds of nets, such as generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) [39], stochastic reward
nets (SRN) [41], etc. [38],
Hybrid models are analytical models that integrate two or more different types of
analytical models together, often in a hierarchical way. The software packages that
support hybrid models include CARE [21], HARP [22], and SHARP [23],
Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) uses the fault tree representation to capture systems
dynamic behaviors by adding several logical gates [42], such as functional dependency
gate, sequence enforcing gate, priority AND gate, etc. A software package is necessary to
host a DFT model, and translate the model into an underlying Markov model. The
Markov model is then solved and the result is given to the modeler.

2.4 Model Generation and Existing Software Packages
System modeling and analysis is generally a two-step process: (1) abstracting the
real world problem into an analytical model, and (2) solving the model to produce a value
for the measure of interest. The first step is to create the model, and it is the task o f
modelers; the second step is almost always solved by using a computer, except for trivial
problems which can be solved by hand. Thus, analytical modeling is a technique o f
choosing the best way to represent the model (the modeling part), to solve the model (the
mathematical part). One can also argue that the analytical modeling is a three step
process: create the model, represent the model into a computer, and solve the model by
the computer. In this case, the modeler needs to choose the model type, abstract the
system into the model, and represent the model in the computer.
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Creating an analytical model needs the modeler to intimately understand the
system and its behavior, and be well versed in the underlying mathematical theories.
Experience is the most effective way to increase the skill. It often requires step learning
curve in one area (the system) or the other (mathematical theory) by a person doing the
modeling work. Once the system and the underlying mathematics are understood, the
modeler then needs to capture the relevant behavior o f the system into the model.
Modeler should consider tradeoffs between complexity and accuracy. The more details
and more components captured in the model, the larger and more complex the model will
be. As a consequence, it will take a long time to have a solution, or there is no solution
for the reason that computer cannot handle such a model. If the model is too complex to
be solved by computers, the modeler needs either to simplify the model by eliminating
more detail behavior o f the system such as model decomposition at system level,
coverage modeling, or use mathematical theories to have a approximate solution such as
state space aggregation and truncation. Certainly, the system can be modeled in one way
or another, and an approximation is better than no solution at all.
Therefore, the analytical modeling becomes an iterative process, that is,
representing the system in a model, solving the model by a computer. If the solution is
not satisfied, the modeler needs to go back to remodel the system until a desired solution
is achieved. Sometimes the correctness o f the solution cannot be guaranteed, because the
system can be modeled in many ways, and the computer may not always give the right
result due to the algorithm applied and the round off errors. One way to get a good
feeling on the model is for the modeler to build up different types o f models, and/or to
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use a completely different computer package to evaluate the exact same measure and
compare the results.
There are a variety of software packages that exist [11][12] to facilitate models
solving. Some are programs oriented, and some o f them are equipped with GUI editors to
provide modelers with visual means to enter the model into the computer. CARE [21],
HARP [22], and SHARPE [23] support combinatorial modeling. Dependability modeling
software packages that solve continuous time homogeneous Markov chains include
ARIES, SURF, SAVE, and ACE [11]. CARE and HARP support solving homogeneous
and non-homogeneous Markov models. HARP, SHARPE and SURE are also designed to
solve semi-Markov models. There are many software tools available for stochastic Petri
net specification and analysis, which include SPNP [24], GreatSPN [25], ESP [26], and
UltraSAN [27]. Galileo [28] is the software package for dynamic fault tree modeling.

2.5 Two State Markov Model
This section gives the proof to the availability o f a repairable component via a two
states Markov model. This concept is used to achieve availability modeling via
combinatorial models, and will be used in this dissertation later on. Thus, it is necessary
to lay out the proof herein.
Considering a repairable component with failure rate X and repair rate ju, Figure
2.3 shows the corresponding two-states Markov model o f the component. The model has
two states, state 1 and state 0. State 1 means the component is functioning, and state 0
means the component has failed.
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Figure 2.3 A two-state Markov model
The availability of the component is actually the probability that it is in state 1.
The generator matrix is:

Q=

-n

n

X

-X

(2 .21)

Then the differential equation becomes
710 = ~ jX K 0 + X

k j

(2.22)
7 t| = h t Tq — X tcj

Note that x 0 is used here instead o f x 0(t), and n x instead o f n x{t) for the purpose o f
clarity. Because x 0 + n x = 1, so the second equation o f (2.22) can be written as
n\ = /y(l —7T,) —X n x

(2.23a)

7t\ + { f l + X ) x x = / /

(2.23b)

or

Multiply both sides by e ^ M+x^' = e ^ +x^‘ , we get
e(f,+x),7i■; +(/! + X)e{M+x)'7rl = jueifJ+x)‘
(eifl+x},x j = ^ e ifl+x}'
(eifl+x),x . ) = - ^ - e {fl+x)' +c
V
17 fi + k
7tx = - ^ - + c e ‘M '

M+ k
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use the initial condition

, (0) = 1 , we get c = —- — . Then the availability o f the
fj. + X

component at time t is
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CHAPTER 3

SYSTEM AVAILABILITY MODELING

3.1 Overview of the Approach
In general, this dissertation deals with modeling availability o f a HPC cluster
[44][45] using familiarized notations, such as UML, as the front end design
representation [89]. The approach is to embed the statistical parameters and information
regarding properties that affect the system availability. Then, it exploits these designs in a
systematic way towards generation o f models that serve as input for reliability and
availability evaluation. The approach requires minimum user effort and eliminates the
need for manually remodeling o f the system since the user can change the design in the
UML front end. Figure 3.1 illustrates our integrated UML availability modeling
framework.
UML Availability
Model

Intermediate

Specification

Figure 3.1 Modeling framework
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The UML based model incorporating the information needed for dependability
analysis is transformed into an intermediate model which adopts an object-oriented
specification. Then, the intermediate model is transformed into the analytical model.
In this approach, the intermediate model representation is to mimic the UML class
and statechart diagrams; thus, it is a one-to-one mapping from the UML model.
Currently, we have implemented part of the intermediate model, which is represented in
Chapter Four. This chapter focuses on presenting alternative availability models for
cluster computing systems. It first presents the model decomposition approach, and then
describes several possible availability models and their availability estimation.

3.2 Model Decomposition
A HPC cluster system consists o f a server and a set o f client nodes. The server
takes requests and forwards the jobs to a subset o f clients, while the clients handle the
jobs and respond back to the server once the work is done. The server and clients are
linked together through a network connection. If the server fails then the whole system is
down; thus, the system suffers from a single point failure problem. The HA-OSCAR [47]
introduced a standby server to the system in addition to the primary server.
The HA-OSCAR has a primary server and a warm-standby server. The primary
server provides the services and processes all the user’s requests. The standby server is
waiting to take control when a failure in the primary server is detected. When the primary
server fails, after a certain time, the monitoring facility will detect the failure, and the
standby server will “wake up” and take over the control. Once the primary server gets
repaired, it will take back control o f the system, and put the standby server back to
“dormant”. More servers can be added into the system with different configurations to
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reduce the downtime, hence, increase the availability o f the system.
The availability of the cluster system is assessed normally when there is at least a
server and a quorum of clients functioning. If there are many processors involved in the
system, and if the continuous time Markov chain model is chosen to describe the
system’s dependability, then the resulting availability model could be extremely large.
Thus, we adopt the “hierarchical composition” technique [29] [30][48] [49]. The system
availability model is divided into two submodels based on the functionalities of
subsystems, a server submodel and a client submodel. The availability model can be
described by using a RBD (Reliability Block Diagram), as shown in Figure 3.2.
server
node

node

node

server

Figure 3.2 The RBD o f system availability model
The system fails when either the server submodel or the client submodel fails.
n

Since A - l - F , from Equation 2.8, we have A(t) = n o - w
1=1

n

^ n Ai (t) . Hence, the
i=i

system’s availability is:
^sys = d s A N

(3.1)

where Asys, As , and AN denote the availability for the system, server, and client
model, respectively. For the simplicity purpose o f availability evaluation, we assume that
the N client nodes are identical and exponentially distributed with failure rate

and

repair rate n n . The client submodel requires at least N client nodes to keep the system
functioning. The availability o f the client submodel is given by
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AN = t l <

(3.2)

1=1

where A„ and A„ are the availability and unavailability o f a single client node at
time t , given by [37]
=

+
K +

(3.3)
K+

=

<3'4)

On the other hand, servers are normally implemented with complex mechanisms,
leading to a complicated model, hence need to describe more intricate interactions. The
complicated behavior can be modeled by a continuous

time Markov chain

[29][30][31][32]. We adopt an object-oriented, event generating, and message passing
technique [36] to specify the interaction between servers. The object-oriented
specification o f the servers and the transformation that converts the specification into a
corresponding continuous time Markov model are described in Chapter Four.

3.3 Alternative of Availability Models
This section lists a few alternative availability models based on the cluster system
configuration. The server’s availability models are specified by Markov models with
states and transitions listed. The functioning states are marked as Y. We assume the
servers have the same failure and repair rates, and the system is functioning if there is at
least one server working. Figure 3.1 lists some parameters that will be used for the
availability estimation.
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Table 3.1 Parameters for availability estimation
Mean
Time

Input Parameters

Rate

Prim ary server failure

5,000 hrs

0.0002

Prim ary server repair

4 hrs

0.25

Failure detection

5 min

720

W arm standby server failure

5,000 hrs

0.0002

A ctive standby server failure

10,000 hrs

0.0001

Standby server activation

5 min

720

Standby server deactivation

5 min

720

Standby server repair

4 hrs

0.25

Single Active Server. The Markov model for a single active server is a simple two
state model, and it is given by the end o f Chapter Two. Thus, the model is omitted here.
Active-Standby Server. The Markov states and transitions o f the active-standby
servers are given in Chapter Four as an example; thus, the model is not repeated here.
The k-out-of-n Structure. The k-out-of-n structure is based on Formula 2.10.
Active-Active Servers. The Markov states and transitions o f the active-active
servers are listed in Table 3.2.
Three Active Servers. The Markov states and transitions o f three active servers
are listed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2 Active-Active Markov states and transitions

#

States

0:

u

U

Y

1:

D

U

Y

2:

U

D

Y

3

D

D

Destination

Rate

#

S o u r ce

1

0

1

0.0002

2

0

2

0.0002

3

l

0

0.25

4

l

3

0.0002
0.0002

5

2

3

6

2

0

0.25

7

3

2

0.25

8

3

1

0.25
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Table 3.3 Three active servers

#
0
1
2

3
4
5
6
7

#

S o u rce

Destination

rate

1

0

1

0.0002

2

0

2

0.0002

3

0

3

0.0002

4

1

0

5
6

4

0.25
0.0002

5
4

0.0002
0.0002

states

7

1
1
2
2

0

0.25

uuu

8
9

2

0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
0.25

DUU
UDU
UUD
D DU
DUD
UDD
DDD

10
11
12

3
3

6
5
6
0

Y

13
14

4
4

2
1

0.25
0.25

Y

15

4

7

0.0002

16
17

5

3
7
1

0.25
0.0002

18

5
5

19
20
21

6
6
6

7
3
2

22

7

6

23
24

7
7

5
4

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

3

0.25
0.0002
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

3.4 Availability Estimations
In this section, we list some figures o f the evaluation results for the availability
models presented in the previous section, as shown in Figure 3.3 - Figure 3.7. The
parameters used are given in Table 3.1. We can see that for a single server, it reaches the
steady-state availability at 0.9992. Both o f the active-active and active-standby servers
reach the six-nine (0.999999). The three active servers reach 9-nine.
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Figure 3.3 Single server availability estimation
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Figure 3.4 Active vs standby server availability estimation
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Active-Standby Estimate
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Figure 3.5 Active-Standby server availability estimate
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Figure 3.6 Active-Active server availability estimate
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3 Active Servers Estimate
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Figure 3.7 Three-Active servers availability estimate
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CHAPTER 4

THE OBJECT-ORIENTED SPECIFICATIONS

4.1 Introduction
Markov processes, also known as continuous time Markov chains (CTMC)
[50][51], have been widely applied to a variety o f fields. A Markov Process {.Y(r),r>o}
serves as a platform for modeling stochastic systems, particularly for evaluating
reliability and performance o f computing systems. However, complex systems often
result in large Markov models, which are out o f the logic view o f the systems. Hence, it
becomes a tedious task to insert all o f the Markov states and transitions manually.
This dissertation proposes an object-oriented modeling framework for Markov
chain specification and generation. The approach aims to facilitate computing systems’
availability modeling. An availability model is specified in an XML [8] file, in which
each component in the system is depicted as an object. Then the XML specification file is
transformed into a corresponding Markov model, with a list of Markov states and a list o f
Markov transitions. After that, the Markov model is solved by a Markov chain evaluator.

4.2 Background and Related Work
Varieties o f software packages exist to facilitate the reliability modeling and
specify the models in compact forms [11][12][22][23][24][28]. UML is a widely-adopted
modeling language used to visualize, specify, construct, and document the artifacts o f a

38
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software system [2], UML not only encapsulates a rich set o f diagrams, but also provide
features such as stereotypes, tagged values, and constraints that can be customized and
extended. Therefore, by adopting a subset o f UML notations and formalizing them with
proper semantics, it is feasible to transform the UML model automatically into
corresponding analytical models.
Recently, researchers have attempted using UML to elaborate systems’
dependability and performance aspects.

ARAT [3][4] produces the dynamic metrics

from UML usecase, statechart, and sequence diagrams for risk assessment at the
architecture level. HIDE [5] [6] supports dependability evaluation by elaboration o f an
automatic transformation from UML to Timed Petri Nets (TPN). Pai and Dugan [7]
present an approach to automatically generate Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) [28][42] from
a UML system model. These approaches are similar in the way that UML diagrams are
used to elaborate the systems, together with stereotypes, constraints, and tagged values;
the difference is in embracing different diagrams, extensions, annotations, and in aiming
at different systems.
Clearly, there is no unique solution to UML dependability modeling and its
transformation. Indeed, UML is composed o f a series o f diagrams that depict the class
structure, dynamic properties, and event sequencing for an object-oriented software
system with no formal semantics attached to the individual diagrams. Therefore, it is
impossible to apply rigorous automated analysis. However, formalizing a subset o f UML
diagrams to produce semantics to a given domain is feasible. UML formalization and
transformation are still an ongoing research [8] [9] [10]
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4.3 Overview
An object has a unique event based behavior in relevance to other objects in the
system. We propose a scheme to describe the system’s availability by adopting a subset
of the object oriented features, and represent the objects in a XML format file. In this
way, the XML representation o f the system’s reliability can be customized easily and
configured during the runtime. The framework is depicted in Figure 4.1.

OOMS

OOMCr

MM

Figure 4.1 OOMSE Framework
OOMS represents the Markov chain specification in an object oriented fashion.
The specification is a one-to-one mapping from the UML statechart diagrams. OOMG is
the Markov chain generator, which transforms the OOMS into a list o f the corresponding
Markov states and a list o f Markov transitions - a Markov Model (MM). The user can
view and customize the Markov model. Then the Markov model is passed into the Java
Markov chain analyzer (JAMACA) to be evaluated, and the result is returned to the user.
In the object-oriented availability specification paradigm, each component in the
system is treated as an object. The system’s availability model is actually delineated by
the state changes o f each object and the interactions among these objects. The
corresponding Markov model is generated by all o f the possible combinations o f states in
each object, together with the restrictions o f guards, triggers and actions. Figure 4.2 gives
a simple example o f two objects’ interaction.
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|

Up

Warm

/S.irateup;afler)

wakeup

Down

Up

(a) Primary Server

(b) Stardby Server

Figure 4.2 Statecharts for two servers
Figure 4.2 shows a computing system with primary server P and a standby server
S in two statechart diagrams. Figure 4.2 (a) shows primary server and Figure 4.2 (b)
shows the standby server. Initially, the primary server is working, and the standby server
is in the warm state waiting to take over the control. The corresponding Markov state is
specified as

UW,

where

U

denotes up state and

W

is for warm state. After

ti

time, the

primary server fails, the transition from up to down is fired, and the transition in S labeled
in wakeup is enabled, which change the state o f S from warm to up in the time o f 12 . The
word “after” given in the parenthesis denotes that the action is taken after the transition.
The sequence of Markov states is

UW

DW

DU.

A subset o f object-oriented structuring is adopted in the approach. We also extend
the concepts by allowing a sequence o f actions instead a single one. This can be achieved
in the UML statechart diagram by separating individual actions by a special symbol, i.e.,
a comma. Moreover, an action is preceded with the respond object’s name followed by
the dot (.) operator. In this way, it speeds up searching for the right trigger. The modeling
scheme is laid out and regulated in definitions given in the following section.
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4.4 Definitions
Definition 4.1 An object is a 4-tuple O = {/V, S, S0 , E} where:
N - the unique name o f the object
S-

the set o f possible states for the object

S0 -

the initial state for the object, and S0 e S

E-

the set o f events that can be generated by the object.

An event is defined as a timed event that changes the object from a source state to
a destination state. Thus, an event is defined by E = {r}, where T is a set o f state
transitions for the event, T =

j.

A transition consists o f a source state, a destination state, a firing rate, and may
optionally be associated with a trigger, a guard, and a sequence o f actions. A transition is
enabled either by a self generated timed event or triggered by another object’s action. We
assume all o f the timed events and triggered events are exponentially distributed. A
transition is regulated as follows.
Definition 4.2 A transition is a 6-tuple t = {s,d,r,tr,g,A}
where
s - source state o f the transition

d - destination state o f the transition
r - firing rate of the transition
tr - trigger o f the transition
g - guard o f the transition

A a set o f actions, A= ,a2, •••

j
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4.5 Grammar
The grammar [68] for the XML representations is presented in this section,
preceded with a list of acronyms for the grammar’s readability.
Acronyms:
S - the start symbol
SU - system up
OBS - objects
OBN - object name
OB - object
OU - object up
STS - states
ST - state
TRANS - transitions
TRAN - transition
TG - trigger
TGN - trigger name
GDS - guards
GD - guard
ACTS - actions
ACT - action
Grammar:
S-* <systemup>SU</systemup >
<objects>OBS</objects>
S U ^ (S U O p S U )\O U
O U -* OBN=ST
OBS -» OBS OB\OB
OB -* <object name = String>
<states>STS</states>
<initial state>ST</state>
<events> TRANS</events>
</object>
T R A N S^ TRANS TRAN\TRAN
TRAN-* tra n sitio n src=STdst-STrate= N um >
TG GDS ACTS </transition>
TG -* <trigger>TGN</trigger>\ £
G D -* <guard>GD Op GD\G </guard>\e
G-* <guard>OBN [= =\\=]ST</guard>\ e
ACTS-* ACTS\ACT
ACT^> <action>OBN.TGN(before\ after)</action> \ e
OBN ^ String
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STS ^ STS\ST
ST -> String
TGN^> String
O p^ [& & |||]
S tr in g s [a-zA-Z0-9]+
Num -> [0-9]+.[0-9]+
Terminals = <, >, /, systemup, objects, object, name, states, state, initial events,
transition, src, dst, rate, trigger, guard, action, before, after.

4.6 Algorithm
In this section, we briefly illustrate the algorithm that transforms a list o f objects
into CTMC. For the sake o f clarity, the algorithm is broken into five major procedures,
namely the main procedure, generate states, process transitions, perform transition, and
perform action. Pseudo - Java code is used to depict the algorithm for convenience.
Members o f objects are accessed by the dot operator (.), i.e., t.guard; meanwhile,
members o f lists and strings are accessed via the [ ] operator, as they are in arrays, i.e.,
state[i].
4.6.1 The Main Procedure
The main procedure takes in a list o f objects. It maintains also three lists, namely
a list o f old states, a list o f new generated states, and a list o f generated transitions, as
global variables. The procedure first creates the initial Markov states via synthesis all o f
the objects’ initial states, separated by commas, and adds the initial state to the new state
list. Then it takes a state from the head o f the new list, calls the generate procedure
(which generates new states and transitions) to handle the state, appends the state to the
end o f the old list, and remove the state from the new list. Finally, it marks the “good”
states in the old list. The following gives a skeleton o f the procedure.
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While the new list is not empty
Do
state = head o f the new list
call generate (state);
append state to old list;
remove state from new list;
4.6.2 Generate States and Transitions
The generate state procedure takes a state (a string) as a parameter, and generates
new states and new transitions whenever it is possible. The procedure traverses the object
list and the transitions in each object, and then it calls the process transition procedure to
handle each transition.
4.6.3 Process Transitions
The process transition procedure takes a global state, an object state, the object
position in the object list, and a transition o f the object as parameters. The procedure first
checks whether the transition meets the three conditions: (1) there is no trigger (a
transition with a trigger cannot be fired by itself), (2) the guard is satisfied, and (3) the
transition’s source meets the current object state. Consequently, the procedure checks
whether there is any actions associated with the transition. If there is no action, the
transition is fired accordingly. If the action is characterized as “before”, as indicated by
the action’s parameter, the action is fired before firing the transition. Conversely, the
transition is fired before the action, provided that the action is marked as “after”.
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4.6.4 Perform Transition
The perform transition procedure first creates a new state by replacing the current
state’s zth component with the destination o f the transition (state[i] = t.dst). Secondly, it
creates a new Markov state transition by setting the transition’s source to the old state,
and destination to the new state, together with the transition rate. Furthermore, the
procedure adds the new state to the new state list, and the new transition to the transition
list.
4.6.5 Perform Action
The perform action procedure first finds the object position via the object name
specified in the action, then locates the transition that possesses the trigger, and finally
calls the perform transition procedure to fire the transition, provided that the guard
condition is satisfied and the transition’s source meets the current object state.

4.7 Examples
This section gives two examples to illustrate the methodology. The first example
consists o f two objects, while the second example has three objects interacting with each
other.
4.7.1 Example 1
We adopt the HA-OSCAR system [47] as a target model, with minor
modifications for the sake of simplicity. The system has a primary server P and a warmstandby server S. The primary server provides the services and processes all the user’s
requests. The standby server is waiting to take over the control when a failure happens in
the primary server. When the primary server fails, after a certain time, the monitoring
facility will detect this failure, and the standby server will be “waken up” and takes over
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the control. Once the primary server gets repaired, it will take back the control o f the
system, and put the standby server back to “dormant.” Table 4.1 gives the XML
specification for the two servers.
Table 4.1 OOMS o f two servers in XML
<system up> (P=U || S=U) <system up>
<objects>
<object nam e="P">
<states>
<state nam e="U "/>
<state nam e="D "/>
</states>
<initial state="U '7>
<events>
<transition src="U " dst="D" ra te = "tp l7 >
<action>S.w akeup(after)</action>
</transition>
<transition src="D " dst="U" rate="tp2">
<action>S.dorm ant(before)</action>
</transition>
</events>
</object>
<object nam e="S">
<states>
<state nam e="W "/>
<state nam e="U '7>
<state nam e="D "/>
</states>
<initial state="W "/>
<events>
<transition src="W " dst="U" rate= "tsl">
<trigger>w akeup</trigger>
</transition>
<transition src="W " dst="D" rate="ts2'7>
<transition src="U " dst= ”D" rate="ts3"/>
<transition src="U " dst="W " rate="ts4">
<trigger>dorm ant</trigger>
</transition>
<transition src="D " dst="W " rate="ts5">
<guard>P==U </guard>
</transition>
</events>
</object>
<objects>____________________________________

In Table 4.1, the first line specifies that the system requires either P or S to be
functioning. The primary server consists o f two states, up (U) and down (D), while the
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standby server has an additional warm (W) state. Initially, the primary server is
functioning, and the standby server is in the warm state. Hence, the initial Markov state is
UW. When the primary server fails after a certain time tp l, it goes to state D, and the
standby server is brought to state U by the trigger “wakeup” after time tel. The action
wakeup takes a parameter “after” to indicate the action needs to be performed after the
transition is fired. The sequence o f generated Markov states is

UW—»DW—>DU.

After it

gets repaired, the primary server will go to state U again, and leave the standby server to
state

W.

The generated Markov states are

D U —»D W -» U D .

The action dormant takes a

parameter “before” to indicate the action needs to be performed before the transition
fired. The standby server can fail when it is in both warm and up states. It can be repaired
only when the primary server has not failed, and this is guarded by the condition P = U .
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 list the generated Markov states and transitions.
Table 4.2 Markov states for two servers
#
1
2
3
4
5

States
U ,W
D,W
D,U
U,D
D,D

Up
Y
Y
Y

Table 4.3 Markov transitions for two servers
#

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

Source
U ,W
D ,W

u,w
D ,W
D ,W
D,U
D,U
U,D
D,D

Destination
D,W
D,U
U,D
U,W
D,D
D,W
D,D
D,D
U,D

Rate
tp l
ts l
ts2
tp2
ts2
ts4
ts3
tp l

JEI
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4.7.2 Example 2
We use a hypothetical system as the second example, by adding an additional
“cold” standby server C to the previous example. Initially, C is in the “cold” state. It will
be brought to the “warm” state whenever the primary server or the warm standby server
fails. It will be in the “up” state when both the primary server and the standby server
failed. It will be put back to “sleep” when the first two servers are healthy. The cold
server can fail in both the “up” and the “warm” state, but no failure will happen when it is
in the “cold” state.
The difference from the previous example in specification is that when the
primary server fails or get repaired, it needs to enable the triggers in the “warm” standby
server and the “cold” standby server, sequentially. While the “warm” standby and the
“cold” standby servers need to specify guard conditions to prevent unnecessary events to
happen. For example, if the Markov state is
the first state goes from

U

to

D,

UDW,

and a failure happens to the first server,

and then changes the Markov state to

DDW.

The

corresponding actions try to wake up the second or the third server by enabling the
triggers. However, the second and the third servers are in state

D

and

W,

therefore, the

S . w a k eu p and C . w arm up triggers cannot enable the transitions and are ignored.
Nevertheless, the

C

. w a k eu p trigger changes the Markov states from

DDW

to

DDU.

The

complete specification o f the three servers is given in Table 4.4, and the generated
Markov states and Markov transitions are given in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6.
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Table 4.4 XML specification o f three servers
<system up> (P=U || S=U ||C =U ) <system up>
<objects>
<object nam e="P">
<states>
<state nam e="U "/>
<state nam e="D "/>
</states>
<initial state="U "/>
<events>
< transition src="U " dst="D" rate= "tpl"/>
<action>S.w akeup(after)</action>
<action>C .w arm up(after)</action>
<action>C .w akeup(after)</action>
</transition>
< transition src="D " dst="U" rate="tp2">
<action>S .dorm ant(before)</action>
<action>C .dorm ant(before) </action>
<action>C .sleep(before) </action>
</transition>
</events>
</object>
<object nam e="S">
<states>
<state nam e="W "/>
<state nam e="U "/>
<state nam e="D "/>
</states>
<initial state="W "/>
<events>
<transition src="W " dst="U" rate= "tsl">
< g u ard > P = U < /g u a rd >
<trigger>w akeup</trigger>
< /transition>
< transition src="W " dst="D" rate="ts2">
<action>C .w arm up(after) </action>
<action>C .w akeup(after) </action>
</transition>
< transition src="U " dst="D" rate="ts3"/>
<action>C .w arm up(after) </action>
<action>C .w akeup(after) </action>
< transition src="U " dst="W " rate="ts4">
<trigger>dorm ant</trigger>
</transition>
<transition src="D " dst="W " rate="ts5">
< g u ard > P = U < /g u a rd >
<action>C .sleep(before) </action>
< /transition>
</events>
</object>
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Table 4.4 Continued
<object nam e="C ">
<states>
<state nam e="C "/>
<state nam e="W "/>
<state nam e="U "/>
<state nam e="D "/>
</states>
<initial state="W "/>
<events>
<transition src="C" dst="W " rate= "tcl">
<guard>P==D || S==D </guard>
<trigger>w arm up</trigger>
<transition src="W " dst="D" rate="tc2"/>
<transition src="W " dst="U" rate="tc3">
<guard>P!=U && S!=U </guard>
<trigger>w akeup</trigger>
<action>C .w arm up(after) </action>
</transition>
<transition src="U" dst="D" rate="tc4"/>
<transition src="U " dst="W " rate="tc5">
<guard> S!=D </guard>
<trigger>dorm ant</trigger>
</transition>
<transition src="W " dst="C" rate="tc6">
<guard>P!=D & & S!=D </guard>
<trigger>sleep</trigger>
</transition>
<transition src="D " dst="C" rate="tc7">
<guard>P!=D & & S!=D </guard>
</transition>
</events>
</object>
<objects>____________________________________

Table 4.5 Markov states for three servers
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

States
U,W ,C
D,W ,C
D,U ,C
D ,U ,W
U,D ,C
U ,D ,W
D,D ,C
D ,D ,W
D ,D ,U
D ,W ,W
d ,u ,d
U,D,D
D,D,D
D ,W ,D
U ,W ,D

Up
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
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Table 4.6 Markov transitions for three servers
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Source
U ,W ,C
D ,W ,C
D,U ,C
U ,W ,C
U ,D ,C
D ,W ,C
D ,W ,C
D ,D ,C
D ,D ,W
D ,U ,C
D ,U ,C
D ,U ,W
D ,W ,W
D ,U ,W
D ,U ,W
U ,D ,C
U ,D ,W
U ,D ,W
U ,D ,W
D,D ,C
D ,D ,W
D ,D ,W
D ,D ,U
D ,D ,U
D ,W ,W
D ,W ,W
D ,U ,D
D ,W ,D
D ,U ,D
U ,D ,D
U ,W ,D
U ,W ,D
U ,W ,D

Destination
D,W ,C
D,U,C
D ,U ,W
U,D ,C
U ,D ,W
U ,W ,C
D,D ,C
D ,D ,W
D,D,U
D ,W ,C
D,D,C
D ,W ,W
D ,W ,C
D ,D ,W
D,U,D
U ,W ,C
D ,D ,W
U ,D ,C
U,D,D
U,D ,C
U ,D ,W
D ,D ,D
D ,D ,W
D,D,D
D ,D ,W
D ,W ,D
D ,W ,D
U ,W ,D
D,D,D
D,D,D
D ,W ,D
U,D,D
U ,W ,C

Rate
tp l
tsl
tel
ts2
tel
tp2
ts2
te l
tc3
ts4
ts3
ts4
tc6
ts3
tc2
ts5
tp l
tc6
tc2
tp2
tp2
tc2
tc5
tc4
ts2
tc2
ts4
tp2
ts3
tp l
tp l
ts2
tc7

4.8 UML Availability Modeling
This section illustrates using UML to specify cluster systems’ availability. In the
model, all o f components are treated as objects, and transitions are treated as object
interactions. A subset o f UML notations is adopted, namely class diagram and statechart
diagrams, to specify cluster systems’ availability. HA-OSCAR is used as an example to
illustrate the concept.
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The system model is described using a class diagram with the keyword “system”
as its name to indicate it is the entry point of the model. The system model is divided into
(composite) submodels, in a “tree like” structure, associated with the aggregation
relation, which indicates the “has a” relation, between a submodel and its higher model.
A submodel can have submodels or “leaves”. The “leaves” are object entities defined
either by a statechart diagram or a predefined formula. Failure rate and repair rate are
defined as tag-value pairs. “Siblings” relations are denoted by associations, which are
stereotyped as “series” or “parallel” optionally with a predefined formula as its name.
The servers are modeling by using state chart diagrams. A statechart diagram
consists of states and transitions, and has the following properties:
■ The state from the UML initial state is represented as a filled black circle to
indicate the system’s initial state.
■ A state has a name and a tag to indicate the component’s state status, namely,
Good: true or false.
■ A transition is associated with two tags: failure rate and repair rate.
■ A transition may consist o f guards and actions.
■ Actions are denoted further by regular expressions.
Figure 4.3 shows the Availability Model o f HA-OSCAR as an example. The
system is divided into a client submodel and a server submodel, with the “series” relation.
The client submodel consists a clientnodes model, which is denoted as the k-out-of-n
formula in the method field o f the class diagram. The server submodel “has” the PServer
and the SServer submodels, with the “parallel” and the “CTMC” relation. Then two
server submodels are needed to be defined in statechart diagrams.
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Figure 4.3 Availability model o f HA-OSCAR
Figure 4.4 shows the primary server in a statechart diagram. Initially, the primary
server is in the up state. After a period o f time, it can fail; thus, it goes to fail state. The
monitor will detect this event and bring the primary to down state and “wake up” the
standby server. The “wake up” transition can only happen if the standby server is in the
warm state (w). This is denoted by the “guard” followed by the action, which will change
the standby server to the up state. Once the primary server is in the down state, it
undergoes the repairing process. After it gets repaired, the system will reconfigure, put
the standby server into the “dormant” state, and bring the primary server to the up state.
The transition to “dormant” can only happen if the standby server is in the up state.
Figure 4.5 shows the statechart diagram for the standby server. Initially, the
standby server is in the “warm” state (W), waiting to take over control o f the system. The
transition from W to U and from U to W are denoted as guard “prohibit” to indicate the
transition cannot happen by itself. The transition from down state (D) to warm state (W) is
also guarded since the primary server has the priority to get repaired.
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CHAPTER 5

NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS OF
MARKOV PROCESSES

5.1 Introduction
Markov processes, also known as continuous time Markov chains (CTMC), have
been widely applied to a variety o f fields. A Markov Process serves as a platform for
modeling stochastic systems, particularly for evaluating dependability and performance
o f computing systems. When the transition matrix o f a Markov process is large, it
becomes very difficult to obtain a closed form solution for the transient state probability.
In this case, a numerical approach is normally the choice. There are fruitful numerical
methods for this purpose [53][60]. Among these, the uniformization (or randomization)
method attracts more interests for its series computing and bounded error control
properties.
In this chapter, we first review some existing numerical methods, formalize and
simplify the uniformization procedure, then discuss several alternative implementations
and pitfalls o f the procedure, and finally propose a light-weight model for solving large
sparse Markov processes.

56
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5.2 Numerical Methods Overview
The numerical solutions o f the Markov models can be classified into two
categories: methods for solving the steady state and methods for the transient solution.
This section gives an overview o f the numerical methods in these two categories.
5.2.1 Steady State Solutions
The steady state solution o f a Markov model may or may not exist. It depends on
the structure o f the matrix Q. If the steady state solution o f a Markov model exists, it
follows that the rate change o f the probability vector n(t) at the steady state is zero, i.e.,

dt

= 0 . Therefore, for a homogeneous CTMC, from Equation 2.18, the following

equation holds [31][50][51][54]
nQ = 0

(5.1)

where Q is the infinitesimal generator matrix.
For a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC), let P be the probability transition
matrix, then from Equation 2.17, the steady state solution can be written as
nP = n

(5.2)

which is equivalent to
7 t{l-P ) = 0

(5.3)

The stationary probability distribution vector n also satisfies
ne = 1

(5.4)

as shown in (2.20), where e is a vector with all elements are 1s, i.e., e = {l, 1, •••, l} .
The Equation 5.1 and 5.3 can be solved by the direct methods, iterative methods
[53][54], Direct methods include Gaussian elimination, LU decomposition, etc. Iterative
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Methods include Jacobi method, Gauss-Seidel method, SOR method, and a family of
projection methods.
5.2.2 Transient Solutions
The transient solution o f a Markov model is to find the probability vector n{t) at

time t, by solving the Chapman-Kolmogorov differential equation

dt

= n {t)Q . The

explicit solution is in the form o f n{t) = 7r(o)eQl. There are many different ways to solve
the above equation [50][51][52][54][69], such as matrix decomposition, matrix scaling
and powering, uniformization, ordinary differential equation (ODE) solvers, and Krylov
subspace method. Currently, most o f the existing software packages include multiple
methods inside, and the most suitable method can be chosen either by the modeler [23] or
automatically detected by the software itself [55],

5.3 The Uniformization Procedure
A continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) {x (/),t> 0 } on a finite state space,
with the probability transition matrix P and the infinitesimal generator matrix Q , can be
described by the forward Kolmogorov differential equation [50][54]:

dt

(5.5)

Let ;r(o) and n (t) be the initial probability vector and the probability vector o f
the CTMC at time t , respectively {n(t) = ^■(o)p(t)), then Equation 5.5 can be expressed
as
(5.6)
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and the solution to Equation 5.6 is [54]
n{t)=7r{ 0)eQl

(5.7)

The matrix exponential eQ' is defined by the Taylor series as

Let T > max,.^., ] , where qu denotes the diagonal element o f the infinitesimal
generator matrix Q , and P be a discretized stochastic probability matrix, such

thatP = I + ^ Q ■Together with Equations 5.5 and 5.6, the transient probability vector at
time t can be obtained by computing the following formula:

(5.8)
The above procedure that discretized the continuous time Markov chain is known
as the uniformization method [61] [62] [63]. The transient solution is computed from the
discrete time Markov chain, which is embedded in a Poisson process with rate Tt . The
uniformization procedure establishes the equivalency between continuous and discrete
time Markov chain.

5.4 Implementation Analysis
5.4.1 Truncation Error
In implementation, the infinite series o f Equation 5.8 needs to be truncated at a
certain point to meet the desired error tolerance. The error bound formula is given by [54]
[57]:
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(5.9)

where s is the error tolerance, and k is the truncation point o f that is large
enough to satisfy the desired error control e .
Therefore, the actual formula (5.8) is reduced to compute the finite series as
follows:

4 ) = * ( o ) £ / v r' M
1=0

(5.10)

l '

As shown in [57][58][59], choosing the error tolerances betweenlO’11 and 10”12
will achieve the maximum accuracy.
The truncation point k is referred to as the “right truncation point” for the
Poisson process [59]. Some researchers [60][61][62] suggest also “left truncation” on the
series, as given in the following formula

(5.11)
where / is the left truncation point.
The reason for performing the left truncation is that the Poisson distribution
becomes thin as H grows, and the terms on the left side are small and less significant,
therefore, they can be “omitted”. Reibman [57] gives a formula for calculating the left
bound in the appendix o f the paper. However, this technique is not adopted in our
solution for the following reasons:
a)

As Ft is small, so will the left truncation point; then there will be no need

for the left truncation. As indicated in [57], fo rf = 1010, left truncation is not used if
Ft <25.
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b)

There is no better way to compute the initial matrix power P 1 than by

vector matrix multiplication. As a result, the truncation simply ignores the
e r' ( n ) ' //! factor. Therefore, there is no advantage in doing so.
5.4.2 General Implementation
With a given error tolerance, the right side truncation point k o f the infinite series
in Equation 5.8 is computed. The procedure is naturally implemented by vector matrix
multiplication instead of computing the matrix power, for the sake o f reducing
computation complexity. This is done by simply moving the initial probability vector
7r(o) inside the summation, in which case formula 5.10 becomes

(5.12)
The rest o f the procedure is to compute the vector matrix multiplication iteratively
and add the result to the previous one.
The term e -r' , referred to as “scalar”, may be applied to n after the iteration

[54][59] rather than applied to ;r(o) at the initialization step. Nevertheless, when ft is
large, the term ( r ?)' may grow fast and potentially cause an overflow problem. As a
consequence, the computation either encounters an exception or increases result
inaccuracy, depending on the platform the program is executing. Introducing e~T‘ to the
procedure at the very beginning will keep the intermediate results growing slower,
although the results of the beginning iterations steps are small. However, it will not be
troublesome if Ft is small, as for example in partitioning the time line into multiple time
intervals.
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5.4.3 Multiple Time Intervals
When the time t is large, difficulty arises as e~rAl is too small and ( n ) ' is too
large, causing the computation to underflow and overflow. For such a case, it is necessary
to divide the time into multiple time intervals [54], then calculate the probability vector at
each time interval, and use the results as the initial value for the next iteration.
For example, the total time (0,t) is partitioned into / +1 steps

= t with

equal length A t, and ti+] - tt + A t , then the probability vector at time tM is computed as
follows:

U

j\

(5.13)

The error control used for computing the truncation point k should also be
adjusted to reflect the fact. Stewart [54] suggests using e/l as the error control value for
each time interval, so that the overall error is bounded by the desired error tolerance s .
5.4.4 Small State Spaces
For a system with a small state space, i.e., a system with several hundred states,
the infinitesimal matrix can be implemented in a two dimensional array. With the time
partitioned into equal time intervals, the right truncation point k should be the same for
k
each time interval. The term T = ^TiP i e~l Al (TAt)J/ j\ is a common factor and can be
7=0

stored in memory, thus it can be used in all the time steps [54][63]. The probability vector
at time tM is simply computed by n(tM ) - n{ti )T . We give an analysis on the
complexity of this method as follows.
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Calculating the matrix power P ' for each term is unrealistic. A better way to solve
T is to use the iteration method as shown in Figure 5.1.

Let r = e “rA'
for j = 1 to k do

T = T + TP

Figure 5.1 Algorithm to compute the T term
It will requires o{k - «3) multiplications to solve T and o [ n 2) multiplications
t o r n i t ^ T . Hence, it requires o{l ■n 2 + kn2) multiplications to reach the final solution at
t . If the method is implemented as described in Section 5.3, it will need o(lkn2)
multiplications. To find out if this approach is efficient or not, we compare the operation
cost with the vector-matrix multiplication approach. The storing T approach is more
efficient than then the vector-matrix multiplication if it satisfy the following
l - n 2 +k n3 <lkn2

(5.14)

By canceling the common factor n 2, we get
I+ kn< Ik

(5.15)

and finally we have
/> ^ n~n
k- 1

(5.16)

Therefore, we conclude that for a system with a small state space, and the
infinitesimal generator is implemented in a two dimensional array, storing the common
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factor matrix T for computing the probability vector is more efficient if the divided time
interval / is larger than the system state space.
5.4.5 Stiffness Models
Stiffness problem often arises in dependability and performance models, causing
numerical instability in solution methods. A Markov model is said to be stiff when
max,

» min, |Re(/l,.)j, where Xt are the eigenvalues o f the infinitesimal generator

matrix Q [54]. A stiff Markov process often has one or more states with greatly different
rates. To solve the problem, Reibman and Trivedi [57] suggest choosing small time-scale
as a function o f the slow rate. The experiment in [57][58][59] shows that the calculation
is more expensive for stiff Markov models.

5.5 Large Sparse Matrix
For system availability and performance models, the infinitesimal generator
matrix Q o f the corresponding Markov chain is generally large with thousands o f states
where most elements are zeros [55]. This is especially true when the Markov model is
generated automatically from a higher level description, i.e. Stochastic Petri Net [22], In
the M/M/1 [31] [52] queuing system, for example, the corresponding infinitesimal
generator matrix Q contains three elements in each row (with two elements off the
diagonal) and the rest are zeroes. For a large sparse Markov model, the two-dimensional
array approach is infeasible because o f the limited storage and enormous computing
operations. Sparse storage and preserving methods are used to solve the storage problem
and computational complexity, normally by utilizing sparse matrix implementation
techniques. There are numerous software packages, such as Linpack [65], JMP [66] for
this purpose. Jin and Ziavras [64] present a parallel programming technique for large
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sparse matrix multiplication. These packages and techniques are normally equipped with
full matrix operational features. Hence, utilizing these packages will inevitably increase
the computing code size, resulting too complex to be deployed and distributed.
Furthermore, these general purpose matrix packages may not be efficient for such
specific computing process. A better way is to tailor these packages to suit the
uniformization method.
SERT [63] stores the state space, events, and transition rates into vectors, and
traverse these vectors when computing Markov models. It does solve the large and sparse
problem. The shortcoming o f this approach is its lack o f modularity, from the point o f
view o f software development and maintenance. It smears the interface between the
algorithm and the matrix computation. This makes it difficult to implement the algorithm
and to upgrade the software package thereafter.
We propose our Light Weight Markov Chain solution (LWMC). Our goal is to
create a LWMC calculator, which can be used to handle large sparse Markov models. In
our approach, the transition matrix consists o f n column vectors, where n is the number
o f states o f the Markov model. Only nonzero elements are stored in each column vector
together with their position. The approach is based on the following observation.
Let Cj denote the j th column vector o f the discretized probability generator
matrix p , and {nP)j is the j th component o f the vector-matrix multiplication 7tP ,
then {nP) . = n c j . When performing the multiplication, only nonzero components o f
Cj are used, indicated by the indexes o f the nonzero components o f c] . The operation can
be expressed as (nP)j =

, for all /'and ctj * 0 . Our solution is to implement
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Equation 5.13 and a column-wised sparse matrix equipped with a vector-matrix
multiplication operation only. In this way, the algorithm and the matrix implementations
are separated, leading to a convenient development and maintenance o f the software
package.
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CHAPTER 6

MONITORING AND ANALYSIS

6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss a reliability-aware monitoring and modeling
framework which provides near real-time system availability/reliability analysis and
information for high performance cluster computing systems. Our work aims to address
issues in existing solutions in which HPC system management only considers
performance aspects and leaves reliability to a reactive (i.e. addressing issues after they
happen) or manual recovery approach. Our proposed framework dynamically obtains
availability information such as failure and repair events o f the individual nodes and is
able to model and evaluate system availability for the overall and partial HPC system.
With near-real-time availability evaluation, the framework enables runtime systems such
as schedulers or resource managers to be aware o f more accurate system reliability and
hence better utilization and efficiency o f the HPC systems. Lastly, we demonstrate
usefulness o f our approach to a scheduling runtime system based on the availability
information provided by this framework. The failure and analysis model was
reconstructed from system logs o f the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) machines. The data set was used to
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understand system availability and validate how a scheduler can exploit such information
to improve the overall completion time for parallel jobs in the presence o f failures.
Certainly, the framework can be extended to include more features such as more
detailed error classification, failure correlation, and distributions other than the
exponential distribution with additional efforts.

6.2 General Terms and Concepts
In this section, we give a brief description on the general terminologies and
measuring concepts.
6.2.1 F au lt Error, and Failure
Definition 6.1 A fault is an anomalous physical phenomena, either internal caused
by manufacturing problem, fatigue, design flaw or external disturbance, such as
environmental perturbations, temperature, vibration, etc.
Faults can be classified into transient faults, intermittent faults, and permanent
faults. A transient fault is a fault resulting from temporary environmental conditions. An
intermittent fault is a fault that is only occasionally and unexpectedly present due to
unstable hardware or software states. A permanent fault is a fault that is continuous,
persistent and stable due to an irreversible change.
Definition 6.2 An error is an undesired system behavior, when the system is not
able to deliver services complying with what is expected o f system. An error is a
manifestation o f a fault.
Definition 6.3 A failure is the occurrence o f an undesired circumstance affecting
the service o f the system. The system is unable to perform some action that is due or
expected. It is caused by an effective error that affects the delivered service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69

In general, an error is caused by a fault, and a failure is caused by an effective
error. Figure 6.1 shows the relationship of the three.

Fault

Error

Failure

Figure 6.1 Fault, failure and error
Since we are interested in system availability analysis, a failure o f a component is
considered to be an event that causes the component out o f service such that the affected
component cannot response to any request. A failure o f a system means the outage o f the
system.
6.2.2 General Concepts
The sample space o f an experiment, is the set o f all possible outcomes o f that
experiment [70][71][72], Let X i, X 2,-- -,X n be the random variables form arandom
sample o f size n from some distribution, the sample mean X is given by

(6.1)

and the sample variance is given by:
"

s= —
n- l t r

n- 1

1

"

A

Y.X ' — \'L X>
V 1= 1

( 6 .2 )

/

It has been proved that X is the best estimator o f the mean and S is the best
estimator o f the variance [71],
Goodness-of-Fit Test. Let A, i = 1,2,•••,£ be the number o f observations in the
k

random sample, with the sample size N = '^j N i , and let E i be the expected value o f
i=i
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type i . If the null hypothesis H 0is true, and the sample size is large, then the distribution

will be approximately a x 2 distribution with k - 1

of the statistic Q = ^
i =1

degree of freedom. It is desired to carry out the test at the significance level o f a 0. The
null hypothesis H 0 should be rejected if Q is in the 1 - a 0 quantile o f the x 2
distribution with k - 1 degree of freedom. The test is called the j 2 test o f goodness-offit test [12].
If the sample mean X is used to calculate the statistic Q, then the approximate
distribution o f Q when H 0 is true lies between a / 2 distribution with k - 2 degree of
freedom, and this leads to the following formula:

/=!

(6.3)

X k-2.\~aQ

E.

As an example, consider a component in which the failure time is distributed with
probability density function f ( t ) . The observation starts from t0 to tk with k time
intervals, At, = t, - t 0, At2 = t2 - t x, Atk = tk - t k_i . And the number o f failures observed
in each interval N ], N 2,---,Nk accordingly is given in Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1 Example 1
Time intervals
At,
At2

# failures
n

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

The expected number o f failure Ej during interval Ati is
E, = N \ f(t )d t

(6.4)

6.3 Related Work
Availability and reliability are key attributes of computer systems. Event logs that
are generated by the monitoring facilities provide an effective means o f identifying
defects to improve availability, and they are used in a variety o f ways. The monitoring
mechanisms were originally developed to meet the needs o f hardware designers who
wanted to debug their products. These mechanisms have been developed later on to meet
other needs. Hence, the system logs are the result o f an evolutionary process rather than
being the result of a predefined plan. Event logs have been used in many ways, including
long term trend analysis, online diagnosis use for failure prediction, and MTTF
estimation. The log analysis process is highly dependent upon the quality and
completeness of the event logs. If the information is incomplete or missing, it will be
difficult or impossible to interpret the events’ activities.
There is a wide variety o f research that is based upon the analysis o f event logs.
Lin et al. [73] analyze the error log file on file servers to demonstrate the log is composed
o f at least transient and intermittent processes. Wein and Sathaye [74] present their
experience with validation o f complex computer system availability models. Ram et al
[75] measures the failure rate in widely distributed software. Chillarge et al. [76]
presented a failure rate measurement technique on distributed software, based upon
classifying failure data into “failure windows.” Moran et al. [77] illustrated the
availability monitoring facility developed at Digital Equipment International. These
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approaches are similar in performing data analyses; the difference is the way they classify
errors, the correlation, distribution, and aims at different models.
The uniqueness o f our approach is that our framework automatically performs
data analysis and availability modeling and repository when there are failure/repair
events detected to provide near-real time availability information and inventory o f the
HPC system. Existing approaches either perform the analysis manually or retrieve the
data from the database (logs) periodically in order to generate the analysis report. We
envision that reliability-aware runtime system can exploit near-real time availability
information to improve efficiency and better HPC resource utilization.

6.4 Overview of the Framework
The monitoring framework consists o f two major parts, namely reliability-ware
monitoring and system availability modeling and analysis. The system availability
modeling module provides a near-real-time availability evaluation for both node-wise and
overall system. Currently, we constructed a proof-of-concept for each individual module.
However, we plan to integrate our framework with the availability and system
configuration and build an availability inventory and configuration database with
normalization capability for the actual node-wise and system’s mean time to fail (MTTF)
and mean time to repair (MTTR). Figure 6.2 shows the reliability-aware monitoring and
modeling framework.
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Figure 6.2 Monitoring and analysis framework
In this framework, the monitoring facility is responsible for detecting failures,
repairing other types o f events, and recording these events into the system log. The
failure data record (FDR) is stripped from the system log file and contains only the events
that are necessary to evaluate the system’s availability/reliability. The availability models
are used to evaluate the system’s availability, which are stored in an XML file. The
system’s log, failure data record, and the availability model are stored in a reliable disk
storage. The Analysis & Solution module is responsible for pulling the data from the
FDR, doing the analysis, and feeding the result into the availability models. The
framework consists o f three functionalities: (1) detection, which is responsible for
detecting failure events based on the failure classification, (2) logging, which writes the
failure events into the system log file and the system failure data record, and (3) analysis
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and update, which is responsible for failure analysis and normalization o f the current
system’s availability. Figure 6.3 shows the flow diagram inside the monitoring and
analysis framework.

1 Write Log
3 Update with
new information

2 Invoke

Availability Update
Daemon

Failure
Data
Record

4 Anafysis-I

Mean
Time

5 Update

Analysis

System Log

7 Solutlon-

Model Solution

-6 Update MTTF—

8 Update Availabilily-

9 Report

Figure 6.3 Monitoring and analysis flow diagram
In Figure 6.3, each arc in this diagram is associated with a number to indicate the
flow sequence, and a name to denote the action. The monitoring facility (MON) is
responsible to watch the system health. Once a failure or repair event is detected, MON
writes this information into the system log, and invokes the availability update daemon
(AvailUpd) to update the system’s failure data record (FDR). After that, the
AvailUpd invokes the analysis module, which queries the FDR to get the recent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

failure/repair activity, reevaluates the MTTF, MTTR, etc., and then updates the mean
time (MT) and the specification o f the availability model with this new information.
Finally, the AvailUpd invokes the solution module to solve this availability model. The
result o f availability solution is written back to availability repository on reliable storage.
As mentioned earlier, the monitoring system will maintain the configuration file
in the system database to describe the availability property for each component. The file
is a XML output from our design and availability analysis framework. Figure 6.4 shows a
snippet for a server and a node instances in the availability and mean time file (MT). Each
instance in the MT file has seven fields: (1) the starting time o f the instance t0, (2) the
current time

, (3) the total elapsing time T in hours, which equals to t] - t 0, (3) total

number o f failures TF during this period o f time, (4) the total downtime TDT, which
represents the total repair time, (5) the MTTF, which equals to T/TF, (6) the MTTR,
which equals to TDT/TF, and (7) the steady state availability o f the instance, which can
be acquired from Equation 2.12. Among these fields, only f, and TF are recorded for
each failure, and TDT is recorded for each repair. The rest o f the fields are updated based
on the changes o f /,, TF and TDT.
Once the AvailUpd finishes updating the MT file, it will pass these information
to the solution engine to have the availability result. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 show the
system and the server availability model. The AvailUpd daemon first evaluates the
servers’ availability; it updates the MTTF and MTTR in the servers’ availability model
with the newly updated information in MT, and then passes the servers’ availability mode
to the Markov solution engine to have the servers’ availability.
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<SystemAvailability>0 999928</SysieniAvailability>

<Servers>
< S e rv e r 1>

<t0>7/21/2000</t0>
< ti>i0M /2004</n/>
< T > 2 7 9 6 0 < /T >
<TF>9</TF>
<TDT* 1392 5--/TDT>
<MTTF>3106.27/MTTF>
<MTTR>154,72<MTTR>
<Availability>0.952<yAvallability>
< /S erv e r 1 >

< /S e r v e r s >

<Nodas>
<VNode435>
<{0>7i'21/2000</t0>
<t1>10/1/2004</t1/>
<T>2796Ck/T>
<TF>33</TF>
<TDT>1157<TDT>
<MTTF>>847,27/WTTF>
<MTTR>35 06</MTTR>
<Availablll[y>0.952</Avallability>
<yNode435>

</Nodes>

Figure 6.4 MT file for a single instance
Once the servers’ availability is solved, the A v a ilU p d evaluates the nodes’
availability. It first takes the mean o f the MTTF and MTTR, invokes the k-out-of-n
computing facility by passing in the number o f computing nodes needed, and the total
number o f available nodes. The system’s availability is the product o f the servers’ and the
nodes’ availability.
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<System>
<Servers>
<Availability>CTMC(serverObjs.xml)<i‘Availability>
<(lServers>
<Nodes>
<Availability>K-OUT-OF-N(K,N) </Avaitability>
<.'Nodes>
</System>

Figure 6.5 System availability model

<Objects>
<Object Name="Al">
<states>
<state name=*U7>
<state name=*D7>
</states>
<Good>
•estate nam e=U7>
</Good>
<StatU5 s ta te = V /‘>

<Events>
<Transition src="U" dst=*D“ rate^O 0003217>
<Transit»n src="D" dst=*U" rate=t> 0064837>
</Events>
</Object>

<Object Name="A2">
<states>
•estate name*TJ7>
•estate name»T37>
</states>

<Good>
estate name="U7>
</Good>
< Status state«"U 7>

<Events>
<Trar»sitk>n src="U" dst*TD" rate="0.0003577>
<Transition src*"D" dst»*U" rate*"0.007667>
</Events>
</Object>
</Objects>

Figure 6.6 Servers availability model
The AvailUpd daemon first evaluates the node-wise and system-wise
availability and then updates the availability slots in the MT file. Once the availability is
calculated, the AvailUpd evaluates the availability o f the nodes and the entire system’s
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availability. The update facility performs the data analysis, and updates the MT file. The
failure and repair events are assumed to be exponentially distributed, and computes the
mean, variance and does the goodness-of-fit test. Finally, it generates a report and
updates the system’s availability. Figure 6.7 shows the flow diagram for the data analysis
module.
Failure
Data

Record

Exponential

M ean

Fit?

Report

Figure 6.7 Data analysis flow diagram
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6.5 Measuring and Analysis
We analyzed the system logs of major HPC computing infrastructure provided
from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The system log file contains significant
system events, from years past, collected from four ASC machines, namely White, Frost,
Ice, and Snow. We then performed a detailed analysis on these data sets. For the purpose
o f brevity, we present only the analysis result o f White. White, the largest among the
aforementioned systems, is a 512-node, 16-way symmetric multiprocessor (SMP) parallel
computer. All nodes are o f IBM's RS/6000 POWER3 symmetric multiprocessor 64-bit
architecture. Each node is a stand-alone machine possessing its own memory, operating
system (IBX AIX), local disk, and 16 CPUs. Table 6.2 lists a sample o f events in an ASC
White machine during the four year period, from July 21, 2000 to October 1, 2004.
Table 6.2 Example o f failures in White

Id
1914
1917
1931
1913
1968
1952
1938
1953
1954
1949
1986
1983
1969
1970
1971
1985
1980
1972
1973
1974
2005
2002

Type
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW
SW
HW
HW
HW
HW
HW

Subtype
HW-SSA_ADAPTER
HW-IO
HW-SWITCH
HW-SSAADAPTER
HW-SWITCH
HW-CPU
HW-CPU
HW-MEMORV
HW-MEMORY
HW-MEMORY
HW-CPU
HW-MOTHERBOARD
HW-OTHER
HW-CPU
HW-MOTHERBOARD
HW-IO
SW-COMM_SS
HW-CPU
HW-MEMORY
HW-MEMORY
HW-CPU
HW-IO

W k-endng
7/28/2000
7/28/2000
7/28/2000
7/28/2000
8/4/2000
8/4/2000
8/4/2000
8/4/2000
8/4/2000
8/4/2000
8/11/2000
8/11/2000
8/11/2000
8/11/2000
8/11/2000
8/11/2000
8/11/2000
8/11/2000

TDT
(hr)
2
33
72
2
137
19
23
21
20
21
74
76
48
21
20
74
172
46

S ect
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit
whit

H ost
list
265
275
275
287
017
025
026
067
100
266
010
026
032
052
113
115
128
194

8/11/2000
8/11/2000
8/18/2000
8/18/2000

48
144
144
188

whit
whit
whit
whit

211
241
019
026
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Table 6.2 shows the failure id, the type and subtype o f the failure, date o f the
failure discovered, total down time (TDT) cost by this event, and the system affected by
this event. Note that the TDT is the repair time for this failure, which includes the
response time, resolution time, and the verification time. We analyzed the availability,
MTTF and MTTR for each node in the system. The MTTF for the a node equals to
(total

elapsed

t i m e ) / (n u m b e r o f

f a i l u r e s ) . The average MTTF for

each node in the system is approximately 3923.8 hours.
The MTTR is the ( t o t a l dow n t i m e ) / (n u m b e r o f f a i l u r e s ), which
implies that it approximately needs this much time to recover from each failure event.
The average MTTR for each node in the system is approximately 55.3 hours. The steady
state availability for each node is 0.98. Figure 6.8 shows the availability for each node in
the White cluster system.

Availability for White
12,
1■
**
* **

0.8

*

*

*
*

**

**

* Availability

< 0.6 -

■ A\arage=0.9872
STDEV=0.03292

0.4 0.2
n

-

000

i

i

i

200

400

600

N odes index

Figure 6.8 Availability o f each node in the White system
From Figure 6.8, we can see that the majority o f the availability o f each node is
above 0.95, and a few o f them are below 0.8. The reason could be some nodes had been
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used extensively compared to the others. For the login nodes (assume they are the
servers), the average MTTF is 1997.5 hours, and the average MTTR is 112.3 hours.
Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10 show the mean time to fail (MTTF) and total down
time (TDT) for each node in the cluster White, the means are 3293 and 355 hours, and
the standard deviation is 1217 and 56, respectively. From Figure 6.9, we observe that the
MTTF for each node varies, namely, the smallest MTTF is 230 hours, and the maximum
is 5592 hours. In Figure 6.10, node downtime density indicates that the most o f the total
downtime for each node are around 100 hours; some failure events cost more time to be
fixed, thus increasing the total average TDT.

Nodes MTTF for White
6000 -i

Mean=3923
STDEV=1217

0
51

101 151 201 251 301 351 401 451
Node index

Figure 6.9 Nodes MTTF density
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Nodes TDT for White
10000 1

8000 6000
Q
•“

—— Mean=355
■ STDEV=56

4000 -

1

51 101 151 201 251 301 351 401 451
Node index

Figure 6.10 Node downtime (in hours)

6.6 Improvement Analysis and Comparison
In this section, we give an example to illustrate the improvement o f our approach
to provide more up-to-date system availability information.
The monitoring framework presented here updates the availability information
whenever there is a failure and repair event occurs. Other existing approaches evaluate
these information during a period o f time, such as once a month. The information
collected reflects the availability aspects o f the system during this period, and is lagging
from the actual system’s behaviors. On the other hand, our monitoring framework
presents more accurate results comparrd with others. The dynamic information can help
dependability-aware scheduling and check-pointing to perform their tasks more
efficiently. We will use the events in node 012 o f White to illustrate the concepts.
Table 6.3 shows the events happened in node 012 o f cluster White. We apply both
our technique and a typical approach (assume periodically evaluation on the first day o f
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each month) with these events. Initially (July 21, 2000), we obtain the MTTF, MTTR and
Availability for node 012 is 1997, 112, and 0.98, respectively.
Table 6.3 Events in node 012 o f White
Failures
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Id
2062
2609
2724
3032
3085
3299
3440
4023
4060
4487

Wk-ending
9/8/2000
12/22/2000
1/19/2001
3/9/2001
3/16/2001
5/4/2001
6/1/2001
9/7/2001
9/21/2001
1/18/2002

TDT(hr)
22
36
12
97
2
22
57
40
37
88

Node Id
012
012
012
012
012
012
012
012
012
012

During the first event happened on September 8, 2000, our approach is able to
capture this episode immediately, and availability information was updated with MTTF =
1176, MTTR = 22, and availability = 0.9812. The monthly update technique would still
have the old information (MTTF is 1997, MTTR is 112 and availability is 0.98) until
October 1, 2000. From September 8, 2000 to October 1, 2000, the information about
node 012 is obsolete, because it does not reflect the event happened on September 8,
2000. The situation is getting worse if there are more events happening during the update
period, since the availability information is affected more than a single event.
Figure 6.11 shows the MTTF changes for node 012, both for dynamic and
monthly updates. We can see that there is a lagging for the monthly update. There are a
few points that are different from the monthly update. It is because there are more than
one events happening during that period, and the monthly update techniques can not
reflect this episode. Similarly, Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13 show the MTTR and
availability changes on node 012 for both ours approach (referred as dynamic) and
monthly update techniques.
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MTTF changes
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Figure 6.11 MTTF changes o f dynamic and monthly updates
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Figure 6.12 MTTR changes o f dynamic and monthly updates
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Availability changes
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Figure 6.13 Availability changes o f dynamic and monthly updates

6.7 Reliability and Availability Aware Scheduling
The monitoring framework provides up to date availability and reliability
information for the overall system and also individual nodes. With this information, job
scheduling can be improved effectively. In this section, we present an experiment to
demonstrate the affect o f considering reliability and availability parameters in the
scheduling algorithm.
We have used the events o f cluster White to develop scheduling algorithms that
use the availability information to schedule parallel jobs. The parameters MTTF, MTTR,
and the elapsed time obtained from the information service are dynamically updated
through a monitoring system. There are various important parameters that are significant
in developing an effective scheduling algorithm such as job completion time,
performance, throughput, utilization, reliability, safety, queuing times, etc. Here, we
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consider reliability as an important attribute for a scheduling algorithm and show how the
job completion time is affected when choosing such an algorithm, since the reliability
information can be easily acquired from the MTTF provided from the monitoring system.
Figure 6.14 illustrates a Gantt chart [78] which shows the effectiveness of
completion time for MPI jobs, in the presence o f node failures. As the number o f nodes
increases, the probability that one o f the nodes fails also increases, thus affecting the
overall job completion time. In the case o f parallel programs, the failure will affect the
job running on all the machines. The MTTF for n nodes is given by the following
equation:
M T TF (n,A ) = —
nX

(6.5)

No Failures

------- 1

nodel

Ct
■

—1 1
nodel

One node fails
■................. ..................... .. ........c

I 1

1
nodel

Two nodes fail
! !

node2

I

cT

Figure 6.14 Completion time for a parallel job impacted by node failure
Availability (or reliability) o f the computing nodes becomes a very important
factor in scheduling parallel jobs (such as MPI), because the job must be restarted and/or
reallocated to a different set o f nodes when failures occur. In this case, the completion
time o f the job will be affected in the event o f failure, as shown in the Gantt chart above.
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According to Amdahl’s Law, the maximum speedup achievable is limited by a
serial fraction o f the program. The “speedup” o f a parallel program is defined to be the
ratio o f the rate at which job is run on N processors to the rate at which it is executed on
one node. The speedup S(N) is given by [78]:

S(n)
n

(66)

where p is the fraction o f code that can be made parallel (therefore, 1-p is the code
that has to be executed sequentially) and n is the number o f nodes. The expected
execution time on n nodes T(n) is given by:

S(n)

(6.7)

A job completion time can be described as:
Ct = T(n) + T(f)

(6.8)

Where T(n) is the expected completion time and T(f) is the total time spent on the
nodes that have failed to run the job, p the fraction o f code that is made parallel is
assumed to be 0.891 hereafter.
Node-wise MTTF and the number o f cooperating nodes affect the total system
availability and reliability as well as a completion time. For a given node-wise failure
rate, the total system MTTF decreases (i.e. the frequency o f failure increases) as the
number o f nodes on which the job runs increases. At some points, scalability will
approach a break-even point where a long running job will not be able to finish due to its
completion time being longer than the total system MTTF.
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Figure 6.15 shows how the MTTF varies with the increase in the number o f nodes
for three different failure rates. This phenomenon also elicits a conclusion that runtime
systems, such as a scheduler aware o f system reliability (MTTF), will benefit from
MTTF information, especially more accurate MTTF information from our near real-time
modeling approach. Since there are situations where a job will never complete due to a
relatively short system MTTF, our future work will consider reliability-aware check
pointing technique [80][86] that aims to derive an optimal interval to save application
contexts based on the runtime system MTTF. In addition, we will investigate a check
point and restart time as one o f the repair events, and its time factor that will influent our
total system availability model.

Overall MTTF vs No of nodes
10000
1000
100
10
1

0.1
0.01
0.001
No of N odes

—»— Failure rate=0.002 —•— Failure rate=0.004 —

Failure rate=0.000f

Figure 6.15 MTTF on various numbers o f nodes
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This dissertation presents a novel technique to facilitate the availability modeling,
runtime monitoring, and near real time availability evaluation. The background and basic
concepts o f modeling techniques were reviewed first. We then characterized HPC system
modeling as our targeted problem domain. Three key components are described in the
dissertation, namely availability modeling, model evaluation, and monitoring and
analysis. The HPC cluster system’s availability model is divided into submodels based on
their functionalities, and these submodels are either represented by series structures or
Markov models. An object-oriented Markov model specification has been developed to
facilitate availability modeling and runtime configuration. We reviewed some numerical
solution methods for solving Markov models. We also suggested a light weight solution
for solving large sparse Markov models. The method has certain advantages for its
modularity, platform independency, and small size.
In the monitoring and analysis chapter, we presented a framework to enable
automatically data analysis and availability update. This framework not only is an
important stepping stone to enable runtime systems to be aware o f resource availability,
but also ensures the more accurate result with dynamic analysis approach, hence making
better decisions in unleashing HPC power. We analyzed the actual data based on a real-
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world production system logs from the Lawrence Livermore ASC machines, and fed
analysis result to validate our approach. We have also demonstrated that an impact to
runtime system performability is due to system reliability/availability information.
The key contribution of this dissertation is that we developed a new specification
technique for cluster availability modeling. The specification is more intuitive, comparing
with other existing solutions. The technique can reduce the burden from the modeler’s
shoulder. As the result, the availability model specification can be updated easily to
enable runtime availability evaluation. The technique provides a mile stone for UML
availability modeling, which is a one-to-one mapping from the intermediate model
specification.
Currently, we consider each computer as a single instance under the assumption
such that each instance having an exponential distribution with failure rate X , that means
aging has no significant effect. The theory o f Markov processes assumes that the waiting
time in a state before a transition to another state occurs, is a random variable having an
exponential distribution. The future work should extend the model to include aging. This
can be done by considering semi-Markov model [50], where the failure is not exponential
but may be Weibull, or Gamma distributions. The modeling framework can also be
extended to capture more detailed system behaviors, such as software failure. The
monitoring and analysis facility needs to be able to diagnosis the software defects as well,
and detailed failure classification. Furthermore, modeling evaluation should include more
methods, and be able to choose the appropriate method(s) for a particular model. The
system’s availability model is under the assumption such that, if the monitoring cannot
receive the response o f any node, it considers that the node to has failed. This deficiency

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

can be extended by monitoring and modeling more detailed events and instances in each
node and probing critical services or applications o f interest. Non-homogeneous Markov
model and semi-Markov model [71] should also be investigated to represent the system’s
behaviors.
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Algorithm: Generate state-spaces and transitions
Note:
■ The algorithm is written in pseudo - Java code
■ Members o f an object are accessed using the dot operator, i.e., t.guard
■ Members of lists, strings are accessed via the [ ] operator, as they are in arrays, i.e.,
statefi]
Main procedure
Given: a list o f objects
Output: a list of Markov states with “good” states are marked, and a list o f transitions
Variables:
state - a global state (object states separated by commas)
ol - an old list
nl - a new list
objl - an list o f objects
transitions - a list o f transitions
Procedure:
nl = initialStates(objl);
while (nl != empty) {
state = nl[0];
generate (state);
ol.append (state);
nl.remove (state);
}
mark_goods( o l );
output (ol);
Procedure generate(state)
Given:
state - a global state
Global variables:
objl - an list o f objects
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Local variables:
t - a transition
tl - a list o f transitions
s - an object state
0 - an object
i, j - iteration counter
Procedure:
i=j=0;
s = state[i];
while(i<obj 1.size()) {
0 = objl[i];
tl = o.transitions;
for(j = 0; j<tl.size(); j++) {

t= m
processTransition (s, state, t, i);
}
1 ++;
s = state[i];

}
Procedure processTransition (s, state, t, i)
Given:
s - an object current state
state - a global state
t - an transition
1 - the current object position
Local variables:
src - a source state
Procedure:
If (t.trigger != null) return; //do nothing
src = t.src;
if (src != s) return;
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if(!satisfyGuard(state, t.guard)) return;
if ( t.action == n u ll){
performTransition (state, t, i);
}else{
if (isActionBefore (t.action)) {
performAction (state, t.action);
performTransition (state, t, i);
}else {
performTransition (state, t, i);
performAction (state, t.action);
}
}

Procedure performTransition (state, t, i)
Given
state - a global state
t - an transition
i - the current object position
Global variables
tl - a list o f transitions
Local variables
ns - a new state
Procedure
ns = replace(state, i, t.dst); //statefi] = t.dst
if(!transitionExists(s, n, tl)){
tl.add(new Transitions, n, t.rate));
}
addNewState(n);
Procedure performAction (state, action)
Given
state - a global state
action - an action
Variable
i - an integer, indicate an object position
t - a transition
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Procedure
//l. find the object position
i = indexOfObjectByAction (action);
//2. traverse the transitions in the object, find //the correct trigger
t = fmdTranByAction (i, action);
1/3. check if the t.src = = state[i]
if( t.src != state[i]) return;
performTransition (state, t, i);
Other auxiliary procedures:
■ Procedure initialStates (objl) creates the initial Markov state, by grouping the initial
states of objects together, separated by commas.
■ Procedure satisfyGuard (state, guard) checks if the guard is satisfied or not.
■ Procedure replace (state, i, dst) returns state[i] = dst
■ Procedure transitionExists(s, d, tl) checks if the new transition with source = s,
destination = d, exists in the transition list or not.
■ Procedure addNewState(n) add the new state n to the new state list nl, if it is neither
in ol nor nl.
■ Procedure isActionBefore (action) checks if the parameter in the action is “before” or
“after”.
■ Procedure indexOfObjectByAction (action) first get the object name from the passed
in parameter action, then returns the object position in the objects list.
■ Procedure findTranByAction (i, action) first locate the trigger specified in the action,
and then returns the transition that having this trigger.
■ Procedure mark goods ( o l ) marks the “up” states in the old list.
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Algorithm: Uniformization Procedure
Given:
Q — infinitesimal generator matrix
n 0— initial probability vector
s — error tolerance
t — desired solution time
At — time interval length.
Variables:
P — discretized transition matrix
/ — identity matrix
T — scaling factor
n — probability vector
i, j — iteration counter
k — series truncation point
I — time intervals
Procedure:
Chose r>m ax(|^(l j
p = I+ -Q

r
/ = t/A t
Determine the largest k with 1 -

*

(r/V

---- - < e /l

1=0

Jt = 7t o

for i = 1 to / do {

n = xe~rt
for j = 1 to k do {
K =n +n P —
j
}

}

Vector-matrix-multiplication {n, P) Procedure
Assume:
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I.

P is implemented in column-wise vectors of size n , with only nonzero
elements filled in, together with their position stored separately.

II.

nPi is the summation o f all the nonzero elements o f Pi multiplied by the
corresponding elements in n .

for i = 1 to n do {
n i = ttP-

}
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